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Introduction
For centuries governments implemented trade sanctions as a mechanism to coerce
the actions and policy of other foreign governments (Huffbauer, Schott, Elliot 1985). The
sender country employs sanctions to cripple the economy of the targeted country by
taking over an essential percentage of a countries foreign trade, forcing the target country
to cave into the sender’s policy demand. In spite of a lengthy history, the United States is
still undecided as to how and when it should employ its economic arsenal. Questions
about what causes a successful economic coercion episode and when they should be
utilized remain unanswered. The 106*^ Congress considered more than 100 legislative
proposals for the imposition new foreign policy sanctions, and modification or
termination of existing sanctions episodes (Rennack 1999). In early 2000, the active
public became involved in the debate about the employment of sanctions. Triggering
events such as China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
relaxation of Cuban sanctions, and a dilemma caused by a young Cuban refugee
demanded the public’s attention, and spurred questions about America’s foreign policy
formation. The granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China, a
condition for accession and integration into the WTO, drew attention to the disparity
between the United States’ existing policy of embargo with Cuba and policy of
engagement and mixed sanctions with China. The disparity and public consternation
caused some journalists and politicians to call for a policy review, and/or a unified policy
towards the two rogue nations (Nethercutt 2000 and Rennack1999).
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A unified policy suggests either a policy of economic engagement with limited
sanctions as in China’s case or like Cuba, an across-the-board economic embargo.
Political Scientist, Daniel I>rezner asserts examining the level of conflict expectations
and opportunity cost of a sanctions episode can assess the outcome and implementation
of a sanctions policy. This paper will evaluate Daniel Drezner’s Conflict Expectations
Theory by reviewing the existing blanket embargo toward Cuba and the potential of an
across-the-board sanctions policy placed on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The
results should evidence the outcome of implementing a blanket policy of economic
coercion in each scenario.

Academic Approaches to Sanctions
In the last twenty years, the United States used sanctions frequently as a central
tool in her foreign policy arsenal. Between 1992 and 1996 alone, the United States
imposed or threatened economic sanctions on thirty-five countries, expanding over a
population equal to approximately 42 percent of the world’s population (Schlesinger
1997 in Drezner 1999). The current literature presents a confluence of complicated
factors, sets of conflicted data, and mixed academic opinion leading to the predominate
conclusion that sanctions while more likely not to work than to work, may under specific
circumstances achieve limited policy goals.
Economic coercion is defined as the deliberate use of economic leverage to
influence the policy and action of another country in order to pursue foreign policy goals.
Sanctions are a type of economic coercion defined as the “deliberate government-inspired
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withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations” (Hufbauer,
Schott, Elliot 1985). Sanctions are affected and defined by a multitude of factors. These
factors include: the length of the sanctions, the disparity between the Gross National
Products (GNP) of the target and sender, the size of the demand, the stability of the target
country, who bares the burden within the target country, the goals of the sender country,
the international cooperation, the ability of the target country to realign, military threat,
and the domestic politics within the sender and target country.
There are four main academic approaches thought to affect the afore mentioned
factors which determine sanctions, the necessity of multilateral cooperation, the
concurrent threat of military action, the role of domestic politics, and the unintentional
strengthening of sanctioned targets. In addition, political scientist, Daniel Drezner adds a
new factor to the list of determinants: the expected level of conflict in the relationship
between the sender and target country. In his recent book. The Sanctions Paradox. Daniel
Drezner challenges the assumption that sanctions are a failed policy tool. He offers an
alternative assessment, points out flaws in the existing literature, and offers a competing
paradigm to discern a sanction’s potential for success.
For sanctions to be successful, the first popular approach suggests sanctions must
be multilateral (Yeutter 1999). It is estimated ineffective unilateral sanctions cost the
United States 15-20 billion dollars per year and hinder international relationships (Lash
1999). Multilateral agreements signal to a target country the gravity of the political
demand and ensure the paralysis of the market (Gardner and Kimbraugh 1990 in Drezner
1999). In the imi or multilateral debate, conservatives and liberals generally prefer
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multilateral economic coercion. Conservative political scientists dislike unilateral
sanctions because of the economic impact, and liberal political scientists dislike unilateral
economic coercion because of the lack of ally support and amoral outcomes. Drezner
counters this established viewpoint by showing not only the expense and difficulty of
multilateral initiation, but also that attributed to failed or nonexistent enforcement
mechanisms, multilateral sanctions fail to coerce an improved response (Drezner 2000). ‘
The second approach for determining the success of sanctions places the
importance military statecraft over the importance of economic statecraft. Unilateral and
sometimes multilateral sanctions serve as a signal for impending military coercion. If
military or quasi-military action is threatened or instigated along side sanctions, the
potential for acqm'escence is improved. Case studies such as Iraq’s venture into and
withdrawal from Kuwait and Haiti’s expulsion of their military ruler exemplify
purportedly successful sanctions supported by military action. In both cases, economic
coercion foreshadowed military coercion and led to an acceptance of the demand.
Efrezner argues that while economic coercion may play counterpoint to successful
military action or threat; it is neither the only, nor the best indicator of sanctions
implementation or outcome (Drezner 1999). He points to a statistically significant

' Drezner’s assertion is fortified by the extensive 1983 study by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffery
Schott, and Kimberly Elliot, which demonstrated in comparing um'lateral to sanctions that
statistically multilateral cooperation has little effect on sanctions’ outcomes (Hufbauer,
Schott, Elliot 1985,1990).
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number of sanctions whose success is not based on military threat. The numbers show
sanctions are more likely to be successful when waged against allies who do not face
military action. This policy misconception may in part come from the fact that most
studies concentrate on well-publicized sanctions episodes, which are typically those
between foes and not allies.
A third popular approach for determining the outcome and implementation of
sanctions focuses on the domestic politics of the sender and target countries. According
to the domestic politics approach, sanctions are initiated when the populace of the sender
country wishes to affect change in the policies of the target country, yet feels the cost of
military intervention is too high. The domestic political costs of inaction are too high and
foster an impression of weakness. In response, the sender country will implement
sanctions to posture action even if success is not anticipated. This approach is a popular
response to human rights violations and religious persecution (Rennack 1999). In these
scenarios. Sanctions become a symbol, a stagecraft rather than statecraft.
Unlike Drezner, followers of domestic politics theory tend to disparage the use of
sanctions as a policy tool. They note the inclination of sanctions on rogue states to cause
a rallying effect in the target populace such as those seen in Rhodesia and Cuba
(Gaultung 1967 in Drezner 1999 and Peter Schwab 1999). Disparagers of the theory also
point to target governments who may prefer to be sanctioned because of the rent-seeking
opportunities and unintentional benefits for elite populations. Sanctions that equally
affect or specifically target elite populations are viewed as more effective and moral.
They are more responsible than archetypical “across-the-board- sanctions” currently
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being waged in Cuba and Iraq (Rennack 1999). The theory also concludes the
implementation and imposition of sanctions will be irregular and not based on solid logic
or trade data.
Drezner’s rebuttal against the domestic politics theory is unconvincing. He
centers his refute on the assertion, that for the most part the implementation of sanctions
is not unpredictable and can be predicted according to his conflict expectation model. He
agrees sanctions may cause a national esprit de corps and other benefits for the target
country; yet he fails to make a position on the targeting of elites, thereby in part failing to
disprove the power of the hypothesis.

Drezner’s Contribution
Drezner’s main addition to the literature is his development of conflict
expectations as a factor in determining the success of economic coercion. Conflict
expectations are the amount of future disagreements and dissentions anticipated by the
sender and target country in future interactions. Daniel Drezner took his conceptual
framework and hammered it into seven clear hypotheses, chi boxes, decision trees, and
game theory models to better predict the outcomes and implementations of economic
coercion. Drezner uses Game Theory to explore the conflict expectations model. Game
Theory is a modeling tool using an algebraic model of assumptions and variables to
compare and contrast outcomes with counterfactual possibilities (Drezner 1999). The
algebraic Game Theory is useful conceptually, but limited in its ability to adapt to the
wide range of possible responses and half successes. However, the explanatory chi boxes.
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models, and hypothesis are a useful addition to a developing body of sanctions theory
(See appendix A-E). While, Conflict Expectations Theory is not the only factor
determining the outcome of sanctions policy, Drezner is able to prove its value as a
significant new indicator. Using the explanatory power of Drezner’s conflict
expectations model and concentrating on five of his seven hypotheses, this paper will
examine the outcomes Drezner’s model predicts for the use of economic coercion in
Cuba and China.
Daniel Drezner argues both the sender and target countries incorporate the
expectation for future conflict, along with short-run opportunity costs into their behavior
determinants. If countries are allies with a low expectation of future conflict, the sender is
less likely to impose sanctions and more likely to prefer the status quo. If the countries
are enemies with a high expectation of future conflict the sender is more likely to use
economic coercion to propel change (Drezner 1999). However, this is where the paradox
occurs. Even though allies are less likely to use economic coercion, sanctions against
allies are more likely to result in larger concessions, and conversely, sanctions against
non-allies are more likely to end in deadlock or insignificant concessions (See Appendix
A). For example, during the Carter presidency, sanctions were issued against human
rights abusers. Sanctions were placed on both Ethiopia, who perceived a high potential
for conflict, and Brazil, who held lower conflict expectations with the United States. As a
result, Ethiopia realigned with the Soviet Union and offered no concessions, whereas
Brazil began releasing political prisoners (Drezner 1999 and Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot
1985).
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Figure 1. Chi box: Drezner’s Conflict Expectations Theory and gap in opportunity cost.

Along with his Conflict Expectation Theory, Drezner outlines seven hypotheses
for determining sanctions’ outcome (See Appendix B). These are drawn from his work as
well as the case studies and work of other political scientists. His hypotheses are as
follows:
Hypothesis 1; No coercion event should generate greater opportunity costs
for the sender than the target country.
Hypothesis 2: Within the set of coercion events, the alignment between
target and sender should be negatively correlated with the cost to sender, but
positively correlated with the cost to target.
Hypothesis 3: The target’s concessions will increase when the difference
between the target’s and sender’s opportunity costs of deadlock increases.
Hypothesis 4: The target’s concession will increase when target and sender
are more closely aligned with each other.
Hypothesis 5: If the target realigns against the sender during the coercion
dispute, the target’s concession will be smaller.
Hypothesis 6: Sanctions will be imposed for a longer duration when the two
countries are adversaries.
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Hypothesis 7: If the sender is observed offering a carrot to an adversarial
target, the following is likely to be observed: A) The demand is nonnegotiable. B) The carrot is very lucrative for the target. C) The carrot is
virtuously costless for the sender. (Drezner 1999)
Concentrating on Drezner’s first five hypotheses, one should be able to insert case
studies, such as sanctions against China and Cuba to predict a plausible sanctions
outcome and prove the utility of Drezner’s theory.

2

Explanation of Data
Drezner’s seven hypotheses are based on two factors: assessed opportunity costs
and alignment or conflict expectations. Drezner notes the continuing relevance of several
other previously mentioned determinants such as domestic politics and military threat. He
sees however, opportunity cost and alignment as holding greater explanatory power. To
simplify the application of his hypotheses to China and Cuba this paper will assume the
sanctions are applied “across-the-board”.
The opportunity cost will be assessed using the 1999 GNP trade data from the
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division. The cost to sender will be considered the
same as opportunity cost. TTie Pentagon’s Security Threat list and general state of current
and historic U.S. and target relations will determine alignment (Carpenter 1999, Pregelj
1999, Sullivan, 1999). By these estimations, neither China nor Cuba are considered allies,
and China is considered more of a threat than Cuba.

* This paper will concentrate on Drezner’s first five hypotheses as they are specifically pertinent to die
Cuban and Chinese economic coercion episodes, are the more influential in determining implementation
and outcome, as well as being better developed by Drezner.

9

US Sanctions against China: Applying Drezner’s model
The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America have a
historically contentious relationship. In the last year alone there were allegations of
intelligence espionage, trade dumping, human rights violations, questionable military
maneuvers, and illegal campaign contributions (Rennack 1999). The US-Chinese
relationship is complex. While the United States caimot condone human rights violations
and trade barriers, neither can it afford to close the door to the world’s most populous
country. According to official Chinese figures, its Gross Domestic Product is $4.42
trillion and is expanding at an amazing 7.8% annually (CIA World Fact Book 1999).
The Um'ted States currently maintains six specific laws triggering sanctions
against the Peoples Republic of China, independent of the general varieties of
international sanctions, which can be imposed for everything from human rights
violations to unpaid parking tickets (Rennack and Shuey 1999). Currently most of the
sanctions against the PRC are waved with the exception of a few sectional sanctions in
areas such as satellite exports (Rennack and Shuey 1999). Most recently, the decision to
ignore pleadings to impose sanctions for use of prison labor and human rights abuses was
over ruled in the granting of PNTR for China. The Um’ted States opted for a policy of
engagement.
By Daniel Drezner’s account, the decision to retain the status quo policy of
engagement follows the behavior pjattem predicted by his economic coercion decision
tree and seven sanctions outcome hypotheses (See Appendix C). Reviewing the plausible
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Drezner’s second hypothesis relates the alignment of the target and sender
country to the size of the opportunity cost. E>rezner suggests within a set of coercion
events, the alignment between target and sender should be “negatively correlated with the
cost to sender, but positively correlated with the cost to target” (Drezner 1999). In other
words, if the target is an ally, it is likely the sender will only initiate sanctions if the
opportunity cost to the sender is low and the opportunity cost to the target is high. If the
countries are allies, the gap in opportunity cost of deadlock must be large enough so the
target will prefer concession to deadlock.
Since, China is not considered a U.S. ally, the sender (the U.S.) is not as
concerned about the opportunity costs of deadlock if the target is not an ally, and it is
more likely the sender will consider imposing sanctions. At this point the sender must
decide at what point the opportunity costs for deadlock are preferable to the opportunity
costs of the status quo. Referring to hypothesis number one and Drezner’s decision tree it
is likely the United States will prefer the status quo to a trillion dollar deadlock
opportunity cost (see appendix D).
Drezner’s third hypothesis predicts concessions will increase when the difference
between the target’s and sender’s opportunity costs of deadlock increases (Drezner 1999).
As determined by hypothesis number one, both China and the Um'ted States face high
opportunity cost for deadlock. China’s costs of U.S.-PRC deadlock also include the loss
of access to technology and world markets. Together, both countries face the loss of
trillions of dollars in trade and opportunity. Therefore, it is likely in the case of economic
coercion that if concessions were made, they would be small to insignificant. The large
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concession, which is desired by blanket embargoes, is highly unlikely to be met in this
situation.
Drezner’s fourth hypothesis states, “a target’s concession will increase when the
target and sender are more closely aligned with each other” (Drezner 1999). If the
decision to imply sanctions was made and demands were issued, the size of the potential
concession would be linked to the relationship between the target and sender. Using the
China scenario, the U.S. and China are considered nonaligned countries. Therefore,
according to Drezner’s hypothesis, the likelihood of sweeping concessions can be
dismissed.
His fifth hypothesis predicts if “the target realigns against the sender during the
coercion dispute, the target’s concession will be smaller” (Drezner 1999). The PRC’s
current top import partner is Japan, importing 21 percent compared to the U.S. imports of
only 12 percent. China exports 21 percent to the U.S. and Hong Kong followed by 14
percent to Japan (US Census Bureau 1999). China’s market is fairly diversified. While
their export market is heavily dependent on access to U.S. markets, the PRC does
maintain a multilateral trade economy. It is likely the PRC would be able to gamer
support from regional, ideological, and economic allies. China’s large economy gives it
greater potential for realignment, which would decrease the potential size and
significance of any concession made in response to the imposition of serious sanctions^.

^ In December if 1979, the United States place a grain embargo on the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.). The United
States sequestered the support of other grain exporters. The agreement lasted two weeks. In 1980, the
Soviet Union imported a record amount of wheat, albeit at a higher cost and less than predicted, but at
minimal opportunity cost to the U.S.S.R. U.S. wheat fiumers were hurt and the economic impact hit the
U.S.. The U.S. was originally willing to take the high opportunity cost because of high conflict expectations
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Reviewing the outcome of Drezner’s first five hypotheses and decision tree
demonstrates the potential for across-the-board sanctions against the People Republic of
China to result in deadlock. Across-the-board sanctions are typically linked to a
significant policy demand Focusing events such as Tiennamin Square, on going human
rights violations such as the disappearance of Falun Gong members, and military build up
in the Taiwan strait could all trigger larger demands. However, the adversarial nature of
U.S.-China relations considerably reduces the potential for significant concessions, thus
almost assuredly leading to deadlock. The risk of deadlock, coupled with high
opportum’ty costs for both countries, would force the United States to seriously weigh the
opportunity cost of deadlock with the opportunity cost of remaining in the status quo, and
against the opportunity cost for a chance at success.
The success of sanctions depends in part on the goals of the sender. Sanctions
may either compel a change in policy (i.e. U.S.- South African sanctions to end apartide),
or seek to generally destabilize a country (i.e. U.S.- Iraq Sanctions) (Dashti-Gibson,
Davis, RadcliflT 1997). Across-the-board sanctions are typically chosen for the second
purpose. The success of destabilizing sanctions is linked primarily to the targets initial
stability (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997). TTie chaos caused by the
destabilization of the world’s most populace country would pose a much greater security
risk for the United States and the globe than do the current human rights and trade
violations.

for the opportunity to harm the USSR. The countries ability to realign and the lack of multilateral
enforcement mechanism caused the policy to fail (Drezner 1999).
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According to I>rezner’s hypotheses, with a large specific demand, across -theboard sanctions would be unlikely to work, leaving the United States in a costly,
inefficient deadlock. A destabilization attempt, coupled with unrealistic demands, is also
unlikely to work; perchance it achieved success, it would likely cause problems more
egregious than the current status quo. In the face of contentious U.S.- China relations,
using Drezner’s model, blanket sanctions face little hope as a successful China foreign
policy tool.

U.S. Sanctions against Cuba: Applying Drezner’s Model
The United States and Cuba also have a historically contentious relationship. In
the aftermath of Castro’s socialist revolution, in 1960 the United States dropped a blanket
embargo over the Cuban economy. In the forty years of embargo, the policy underwent
alternating phases of relaxation and tightening (Kaplowitz 1998). 1999 saw the first
major slackening of the U.S. Cuban embargo since the introduction of the restrictive
Helms-Burton Law in 1996. Pressure in Congress forced the exemption of food and
medical supplies for humanitarian and economic purposes (Cubanews 1999). Concern
about the effectiveness and validity of the Cuban embargo was highlighted in the press in
early 2000 due to the media coverage surrounding a young Cuban refugee (Sweig 1999).
Academics, politicians, and citizen groups are publicly reconsidering the functionality of
the Cuban embargo (Schwab 1999, Nethercutt 1999). However, the vehement CubanAmerican lobby continues to flex its powerful opposition against relaxation. In
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opposition, the business sector maintains its position that the politically ineffective and
economically detrimental embargo must be terminated.

The international commum'ty does not support the unilateral U.S. embargo. The
UN votes annually 157 in favor, two opposed (Israel, United States), with 12 abstentions
to end the U.S. embargo of Cuba (United Nations online). International and domestic
criticism claims the embargo actually supports Castro’s regime by creating a scapegoat
for the intense economic distress Cuba has endured since the withdrawal of Russian
support in 1990 (Schwab 1999).
The hemispheric proximity of the two countries and the recovering post cold-war
relations further complicate and confuse U.S - Cuban relations. As policy makers look for
new ways to approach Cuba, and continue to assess the current policy it is useful to
preemptively look down the road to predict where policy might lead. The application of
Drezner’s hypotheses provide a prediction for the future potential of Cuban sanctions, as
well as provide an example of a well-known case study in which the outcome of his
model can be historically reviewed.
Drezner’s first hypothesis looks at the opportunity costs for the sender and target
countries. Because of the pre-existing embargo, the current statistics for 1999 do not
represent the extent of the opportunity costs for Cuba nor the United States. A target is
considered particularly vulnerable to sanction if:
1) The sender country controls a particularly important commodity for the
target nation; 2) the sender nation imports a large percentage of the
target’s important export; 3) the target is dependant on foreign export
items; and 4) if the target economy is highly dependent of foreign trade
(Kaplowitz 1998).
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All of these situations describe Cuba’s pre-embargo economy in 1958 at the starting line
for the U.S. Sanctions. The United States controlled over the 25 percent of the economy
required for a successful sanctions episode (Kaplowitz 1998). Cuba imported 69 percent
of its monbcrop, sugar to the U.S., surpassing the required threshold of 50 percent control
for a homogenous good (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot 1990). It also commanded 90 percent of
the utilities, provided 60-65 percent of imports, and boasted a Cuban-U.S. trade deficit of
$374 million in 1958 (Kaplowitz 1998). According to E>rezner’s hypothesis, the target
must and will shoulder significantly higher opportunity costs than the sender county.
In 1999, the ratio between the GNP of Cuba and the United States continues to be
such that the opportunity cost of embargo rests most heavily on Cuba. However, the
trade percentages have changed. Cuba now trades most heavily with other Latin
American countries, as well as Japan and Canada (Statistical Abstract of Latin America
1998). In spite of the realignment and international support, in the coercion game, the
cost of the embargo is still estimated to generate greater opportunity costs for the target.
Following the economic coercion decision tree, this situation would advance the sender
to consider demand size.
Considering Drezner’s second hypothesis concerning the alignment between the
sender and the target, it is obvious Cuba and the United States are not allies. Therefore it
can be assumed the sender would be willing to impose a more costly embargo. The
decision would run the sender country down the larger demand size side of the decision
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tree/ The sender’s willingness to impose sanctions under a heavy demand follows
Drezner’s expectations.
Drezner’s third hypothesis initially fails to function. At the outset, the opportunity
cost between the two countries is significant and should lead to concession rather than
deadlock. Contrary to the theory’s predictions, we are looking back at 40 years of
deadlock with very minimal concessions. This is not a fault in the theory; rather it is tied
to Drezner’s fourth and fifth hypotheses.
The fourth hypothesis assumes the concession will increase when the target and
sender are more closely aligned with each other. The contentious relationship between
the United States and Cuba was emblematic of the Cold War struggles. The mentality of
them and us ran deep. The Cuban government continues to demonize the United States,
and the United States continues to treat Cuba as a first class enemy perpetuating the roles
and reactions of foes.^ The entrenched mentality causes both sides to take stances
leading directly to deadlock.
The deadlock between the two nations was only possible because Cuba was able
to realign its economy and country with the Soviet Union. The realignment was essential
to prevent the complete collapse of the Cuban economy and people. Drezner predicts the

^ Kaplowitz, identifies “six major foreign policy goals of the Cuban embargo, overthrowing Castro,
retaliation for nationalization of U.S. property, containment of the Cuban Revolution, breaking of SovietCuban ties, demonstration of U.S. opposition, and changing the internal situation in Cuba” (Kaplowitz
1998).
’ The Pentagon no longer views Cuba as a military threat to the United States. In spite of this fact, the
United States maintains a fierce embargo and anti-Cuban or Castro stance (Pope 1999).
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target’s concession will be smaller when a target realigns against the sender during the
coercion dispute.
In 1990, the Soviet Union collapsed and withdrew its five billion dollars of annual
financial support firom Cuba (Toricelli, Bergsten 1998). The Cuban economy atrophied
rapidly without the significant Soviet support. This development delighted U.S.
policymakers. Senator Toricelli (D- NJ), a supporter of Cuban Sanctions, recognizes the
de-alignment as important to the success of U.S. sanctions. He continues to support
blanket sanctions for Cuba. The Senator notes the full embargo is relatively new because
until 1993, U.S. firms were still allowed to trade with Cuba. He states, in the next four
years the Cuban economy shrank by a third, yet four years is just a beginning, and not
long enough to reach success (Toricelli, Bergsten 1998).
What Senator Toricelli predicts is a reversal of the outcome of hypothesis four,
leading to larger concessions. However, he forgets two vital factors. The first is that the
sanctions against Cuba are not only uni-lateral, but they are opposed by most other
industrial nations. Cuba may have limited trade with the United States, but Cuba has a
rich trade relationship with Spain, Canada, and Mexico, as well as many other Latin
American countries (Wilkie 1999). It is not an ideological alignment, but an economic
alignment. Cuba’s international trade is far from substituting the 5 billion in aid fi’om the
Soviet Union, however it does offset some of the embargo’s impact.
The Senator’s second omission is his failure to consider the relationship between
the sender and target country. Tighter sanctions did not improve the relationship between
Cuba and the United States. In fact, academic consensus agrees, Cuban sanctions actually
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bolster Fidel Castro (Gaining 1967 in Dashti-Gibson, Davis, Radcliff 1997, Schwab
1999, Kaplowitz 1998). Reportedly in Cuba the 1996 Helms-Burton Law is commonly
referred to as the Helms-Burton-Castro Law (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997).
The sanctions only continue to fortify the impression of higher conflict expectations.
Thereby, according to Drezner, reducing the likeliness of larger concessions.
Appl3dng both the hypotheses and economic coercion decision tree, the United
States would be economically expected to apply sanctions, and relationally expected to
stall at deadlock in a sanctions standstill. Drezner’s model predicts the actual outcome.
However, knowing the inhibited potential of the current course, it may be in the best
interest of those involved to re-estimate the policy’s opportunity costs. In reconsidering,
U.S. foreign policymakers should consider the cost of ally relations, as well as examine
the potential benefits of alternative approaches such as offering carrots or promoting a
policy of engagement.

China and Cuba: Applying Drezner’s Model
Drezner’s seven hypotheses generally are able to predict the outcome and
implementation of sanctions in the cases of Cuba and China. Neither sanctions episode
leads to a particularly successful outcome, and both lead to distinct outcomes. China
remains in status quo and Cuba stalls in deadlock. The model also demonstrates the
tremendous opportunity cost and poor outcome involved in electing to nail an across-theboard sanctions policy on China.
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The variance in the outcomes of the two scenarios highlights another dilemma:
the difficulty of applying a single policy to two distinctly different countries. The PRC
and Cuba may share state-run-businesses and distaste for U.S. hegemony, but the
similarities do not go much further. Size, location, economy, culture, and reason for U.S.
sanctions separate the PRC from Cuba. It is appropriate to apply some generalizations to
both situations (i.e. across-the-board sanctions may be ineffective) however; it is
impractical to look for one overarching policy to reprimand all U.S. foreign policy
offenders.
Drezner’s model for predicting the outcome of sanctions’ episodes is useful, but it
is not a panacea. In his book, Drezner initially concentrates on developing a game theory
to predict outcomes and implementations. Unfortunately, the actors in sanctions episodes
are not rational numbers and equations; they are people and states. The game theory is
useful as an explanatory tool, but in actual utility it amounts to what critic David
Williams calls, “physics envy”. In fact, after introducing it conceptually, Drezner
abandons his own game theory in favor of traditional case studies and methods.
Drezner’s economic coercion model is also slightly oversimplified. It is not the
Holy Grail of sanctions theory, and cannot explain all outcomes or implementations of
economic coercion. He underdevelopes the utility of “conditional engagement”, and too
quickly dismisses or fails to incorporate the validity of other indicators such as the
domestic politics theory and the symbolic role of sanctions. Drezner recognizes this fault,
but does little to rectify it.
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To his decision tree he eventually adds the possibility of offering carrots or trade
offs for policy concessions. Drezner does not develop this new limb fully, nor does he
demonstrate how it fits in with conflict expectations or gap in opportum'ty costs (See
App)endix G). Megan O’Sullivan suggests “conditional engagement” or the use of
incentives alongside other foreign policy tools offer a possible alternative to ineffective
punitive measures against “rogue” states (O’Sullivan 2000). More research is needed in
this area to examine how conditional engagement functions as economic coercion.
Drezner critiqued other economic coercion theorists for their selection of case
studies (Dreznerl999,2000). Traditionally, studies have centered on cases where the
sanctions are between countries with high conflict expectations and often have a high
public profile. The attention in limelighted cases may cause outcome and implementation
anomalies and ignore valuable information in absent case studies (Drezner 1999).
Unfortunately, this paper fell into the same traditional pattern of selecting two unusually
high profile cases with high conflict expectations.
In spite of the cases’ celebrity, recent developments in Chinese and Cuban U.S.
relations in part substantiate Drezner’s predictions. Drezner’s model predicts the potential
for small concessions from China and moderate concessions from Cuba, assuming the
United States elects to make a demand and the target elects to respond. China’s accession
into the WTO and Cuba’s small market liberalizations seem to follow Drezner’s
predictions.

Low Conflict
Expectation

High Conflict
Expectations

Large Gap in Costs

Significant
Concessions

Moderate
Concessions
CUBA

No coercion
attempt

Minor Concessions
CHINA

Small Gap in Costs

Figure 2. Drezner’s Conflict Expectations Theory and gap in opportunity cost with China and Cuba

China’s accession into the WTO signaled the U.S. decision to forego the yearly
debate about implementing across-the-board economic coercion. In return, China is
forced to meet the transparency and economic standards required by the WTO charter.
The United States and China understood the opportunity costs of non-cooperation and
elected to both consent to minor changes (See Appendix B hypothesis 7). This follows
Drezner’s prediction of small concessions and rejection of costly sanctions.
According to Drezner’s model Cuba should offer moderate concessions. Since
1997, moderate concessions have been made. Small-scale market liberalization and
migration agreements have taken place (Schwab 1999). This is not to say Castro and his
government are folding under the embargo. In fact, Cuba persists to be unreceptive to
considering the demands associated with the embargo. Measures of diplomacy and
conditional engagement seem to be more productive for U.S.- Cuban foreign policy
(Sullivan 1999, Schwab 1999).
I>rezner wants to demonstrate and does demonstrate how sanctions can be an
effective policy tool under the correct circumstance. By the same hand, he shows there
are specific scenarios in which sanctions are unlikely to induce policy change. This
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invites a discussion of when alternative policy approaches such as economic and
conditional engagement, and traditional diplomacy may be more effective.
The success of sanctions episodes is estimated to be around 50 percent (Drezner
2000). This also indicates a failure rate of 50 percent The sad statistics from Iraq about
the human cost of across-the-board sanctions, and the seeming 40-year failure of
embargo against Cuba justify the public and political call for policy reassessment. One
benefit of studies such as Drezner’s offer is the ability to hone the use of sanctions as a
policy tool. This should predictably lead to a more targeted use of sanctions. Cases such
as China and Cuba’s can be assessed statistically, rather than measured on a populanty
thermometer. They can also be better manipulated to force targeted policy changes, or
honestly admit to a goal of destabilization.
Drezner’s Conflict Expectations and opportunity cost analysis should be added to
the growing body of sanctions outcome indicators. While they may not be a crystal ball,
using the Chinese and Cuban scenarios conjectures plausible and realistic effects.
Conflict expectations coupled with opportunity cost prove to be logical and functional
indicators to predict the outcome of economic coercion episodes.

24

List of Works Cited
Cubanet. “ U.S. Senate Panel Votes to Lift Sanctions on Food Exports”. Cubanet. Online.
Accessed 5/27/00. < http://www.cubanet.org>
Carpenter, Ted Galen. 1999. “Eagle in the China Shop: The Economic Consequences of
U.S. Global Meddling. Economic Casualties: How U.S. Foreign Policy
Undermines Trade, Growth, and Liberty Cato Institute. Washington, DC.
CIA. “CIA World Fact Book”. Online. Accessed 5/10/00.
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis, Benjamin Radclitf. “ On the Determinants of the
Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis” American Journal of
Political Science, University of Wisconsin. 1997 V41,12,608-618.
Drezner, Daniel. 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International
Relations. Cambridge Press, Cambridge, UK.
“States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in Unites States Foreign Policy”
reviewed. The American Pol ideal Science Review. June 2000. 520.
2000 “Bargaimng, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation
Counterproductive?” International Orgamzation 54,1,73-102.
Hufbauer, Gary, Jeffery Schott, and Kimberly Elliot. 1985. Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Institute for International Economics.
Washington, D.C.
Kaplowitz, Donna Rich. 1998. Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: U.S. Sanctions Against
Cuba. Lynne Reinner, Boulder, CO.
O’Sullivan, Megan.“ Sanctioning Rogue States” Harvard International Review. 2000
Summer. Pg. 56-60.
Pregelj, Vladimir N. 1999. “ Most-Favored-Nation Status of the People’s Republic of
China”. CRS. Washington, D.C.
Rennack, Dianne E. 1999. “Economic Sanction: Legislation in the 106*^ Congress”
Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C.

Schwab, Peter. 1999. Cuba: Confronting the U.S. Embargo. St. Martins Press. New York,
NY.

25

Singleton, Solveig, and Daniel T. Griswald eds. 1999. Economic Casualties: How U S
Foreign Policy Undennines Trade. Growth, and Liberty. Cato Institute.
Washington, DC.
Sullivan, Mark P. 1999. “Cuba-U.S” Relations: Chronology of Key Events Since 1959”
CRS. Washington, D.C.
Torricelli, Robert, and Fred Bergsten. “Sanctions Against Rogue State: Do they Work?
The Great Debate Series” Council on Foreign Relations. New York, NY.
4/20/1998. Online. Accessed 6/22/00. http://foreignrelations.org.
Wilkie, James W. editor. 1999. Statistical Abstract of Latin America V35. UCLA Latin
American Press, Los Angeles, CA.
Williams, David. “The Sanctions Paradox” Times Literary Supplement. October 29,
1999. Pg. 33.
Umted Nations. “[14 Oct 1998] GA/9479: Assembly urges states to repeal or invalidate
laws with extraterritorial effect on sovereignty, free trade, navigation of other
states” online. Accessed. 8/14/00. http://www.un.org.
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division. “ 1999 U.S. Trade with Cuba” and “ 1999
U S. Trade with China” online. Accessed 8/1/00. http://vyww.census.gov/foreigntrade/sitc 1/1999/c2390. html

26

H e a th e r M e a d e , A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ( S o u rc e D re z n e r 1999)

A p p e n d ix A

Heather Meade August 2000 (source: Drezner 1999)

A p p e n d ix C

o

Vh
QJ
T3
C
(D
c/3

:3
o"
c/3
-4—>

c3

o
•4—4
c/3
o
O
■4-J
P
5
o
Ph
Oh
o

c/3

O

■4—*

o

w
<U
toX)
u
-4—4
o
-4-4
C/3
o
O
o P
o P
-4-4
C/)
<U C/3
Q

cd
CD
T3
c/3
U
^—(
<D
>1
CX
^3
C
(U
c/3

o
M
o

V-i
(U
Td
p
CD
c/3
o
-4-4

c3
(U
Td

-4-H

C/3 -4-4
o (D
o bX)

-4-4 -4-4
'P o
P -4—4
t: -4—4

o
O
04
o

h

o

c/3
o
o
p
p
x:
-4-4

Wh
D
-4—4
p P
<D (D
J-H
Q bX)

0^

so

o

o
L.

o
■4—>

o
d
a"
c/3
P
-4-4
a
c/3
c/3

;-i

<D
T3
P
(D

C/3

A p p e n d ix D

so

Heather Meade August 2000 (source: Drezner 1999)

tin
C
<u
acu
<

H e a th e r M ead e, A u g u st 2 0 0 0 ( S o u rc e D re z n e r 1999)

Heather Meade August 2000 (source: Drezner 1999)

